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An argument is advanced to show that affluent and moderately affluent
people, like you and me, are morally obligated: (O1) To provide modest
financial support for famine relief organizations and/or other humanitarian
organizations working to reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering and
death in the world, and (O2) To refrain from squandering food that could
be fed to humans in situations of food scarcity. Unlike other ethical
arguments for the obligation to assist the world’s absolutely poor, my
argument is not predicated on any highly contentious ethical theory that
you likely reject. Rather, it is predicated on your beliefs. The argument
shows that the things you currently believe already commit you to the
obligatoriness of helping to reduce malnutrition and famine-related diseases
by sending a nominal percentage of your income to famine relief
organizations and by not squandering food that could be fed to them.
Consistency with your own beliefs implies that to do any less is to be
profoundly immoral.
You probably remember many of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
Nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners, crashing two of
them into the World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon, and
one in a field in Pennsylvania. Approximately 3200 innocent individuals
died needlessly.1 People around the world stared at their televisions in
horror and disbelief as the news media aired clips of the attack ’round the
clock. The tragedy immediately roused President Bush to declare “War
on terrorism”. Volunteers from all across America traveled to New York
at their own expense to aid in the rescue and clean-up efforts. Charitable
contributions poured into the American Red Cross, which in turn wrote
checks totaling $143.4 million in emergency aid (averaging $45,837 per
family).2 The U.S. government put together a $5 billion relief package
1 At last count, 2992 people were dead or missing as a result of the World Trade
Center attacks [TIME (December 31, 2001/January 7, 2002), 30], and nearly 200 people
were killed in the Pentagon attack [WORLD Magazine, “2001 Year in Review” (Janu-
ary/February, 2002), 26].
2 September 11, 2001 Victims Memorial Web Site, retrieved January 10, 2002 at:
http://www.september11victims.com/september11victims/.
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that will provide $1.6 million to each of the victim’s families. The U.S.
has spent billions more on its military efforts to root out Osama bin Laden
and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. As the dust from the 9/11 attacks has
finally settled, it is safe to say that Americans are now taking terrorism
seriously.
Here are some of the tragic events that took place on 9/11 that you
probably don’t recall. On that infamous day, over 33,000 innocent chil-
dren under the age of five died senseless, needless deaths—18,000 died
from malnutrition and another 15,300 died of untreated poverty-related
disease.3 It must be stressed that almost all of these deaths were unneces-
sary. They could have easily been prevented. The U.S. alone grows enough
grain and soybeans to feed the world’s human population several times
over. Given this overabundance of food, the lives of those children who
starved to death on 9/11 could have easily been saved, had we only di-
verted a relatively modest portion of this food to them. As for the disease-
related deaths, nineteen percent of the 33,000 children who lost their
lives on 9/11 died from the dehydrating effects of chronic diarrhea.4 Al-
most all of these 6,350 diarrheal dehydration deaths could have been pre-
vented by administering each child a single packet of oral rehydration
salts (cost per packet: 15 cents). Another nineteen percent of these chil-
dren died from acute respiratory infections, most of whom could have
been saved with a course of antibiotics (cost: 25 cents). Most of the 2,300
children who died from measles could have been saved with vitamin A
therapy (cost per capsule: less than 10 cents).5 What makes the deaths of
these children particularly tragic is that virtually all of them were readily
preventable. They only occurred because otherwise good people did noth-
ing to prevent them.
Despite the fact that the number of innocent children who died need-
lessly on 9/11 was ten times greater than the number of innocent people
who lost their lives in the 9/11 terrorist attack, compassionate conserva-
tive President Bush did not declare war on hunger or on poverty. The
U.S. Government did not immediately institute a multi-billion dollar re-
lief package for the world’s absolutely poor. People did not make out gen-
erous checks to famine relief organizations. The media did not so much
as mention the tragedy of so many young innocent lives lost. And, as if 9/
11 wasn’t enough for us to deal with, on 9/12 another 33,000 innocent
children under the age of five died unnecessarily, and another 33,000 on
9/13. In the twenty-two months that have transpired since the 9/11 trag-
edy, over 22 million innocent children under the age of five have died
needlessly. By any objective measure, the tragedy of the 9/11 attack pales
in comparison to the tragedy of world hunger and famine-related disease.
Each year the latter claims 3,800 times more innocent lives than the 9/11
attack.6 Despite the magnitude of the tragedy of global hunger and child-
hood malnutrition, the overwhelming majority of affluent and moder-
ately affluent people, including most philosophers, send no money to fam-
ine relief organizations. Of the 4 million people who receive solicitations
from UNICEF each year, less than one percent donate anything at all.7
For most of us, world hunger doesn’t even register a blip on our moral
radar screens, much less present itself as a serious moral problem requir-
ing action on our part.
My aim in the present paper is an ambitious one. I hope to convince
you (and others) to take hunger seriously. How? By showing that your
beliefs already commit you to the view that global hunger and absolute
poverty8 impose serious moral obligations on moderately affluent people.
Starting with your beliefs as premises, I shall argue that affluent and
moderately affluent people, like you and me, are morally obligated:
(O1) To provide modest financial support for famine relief organizations
and/or other humanitarian organizations working to reduce the
amount of unnecessary pain, suffering and death in the world, and
(O2) To refrain from squandering food that could be fed to world’s abso-
lutely poor.
3 According to the World Health Organization “it is now recognized that 6.6 million
out of 12.2 million [annual] deaths among children under-five—or 54% of young child
mortality in developing countries—is associated with malnutrition” [WHO’s Child
Malnutrition Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet #119, November 1996 (Retrieved on June 29,
2003 at: http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact119.html )]. 6.6 million annual childhood
deaths divided by 365 days yields an average 18,082 childhood starvation deaths per
day. Most of the remaining 5.6 million children who die in developing countries each
year (15,342 deaths per day) die of such readily preventable poverty-related diseases as
diarrheal dehydration and measles. According to UNICEF’s The State of the World’s
Children 1998 Report, link heading “The Silent Emergency”, 2.2 million of these chil-
dren died from diarrheal dehydration as a result of persistent diarrhea [retrieved on
June 29, 2003 from UNICEF’s web site: http://www.unicef.org/sowc98/ ].
4 UNICEF’s The State of the World’s Children 1998 Report, link heading “The
Silent Emergency,” (cited in n. 3, above), Figure 1.
5 All of the costs for these various treatments and prophylactic measures are taken
from Peter Unger’s Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-6.
6 And here I am only taking into account the number of innocent children under the
age of five who die from malnutrition and poverty-related diseases. No mention at all
has been made concerning the older children and adults who die from such causes.
7 Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, 7, n. 7. Again, as Unger points out,
these were targeted appeals aimed at people “whose recorded behavior selected them
as well above the national average in responding to humanitarian appeals.”
8 Following Peter Singer (who borrows the term from Robert McNamara), I use
‘absolute poverty’ to refer to “a condition of life so characterised by malnutrition, illit-
eracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality and low life expectancy as
to be beneath any reasonably definition of human decency” [Singer, Practical Ethics,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 219]. Singer reports (219-20)
that, according to the Worldwatch Institute, as many as 1.2 billion people live in abso-
lute poverty.
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1. Preliminaries
The central questions this essay addresses are not new: Is it morally per-
missible for moderately affluent people who have the financial means to
prevent some innocent children from starving to death to do nothing to
reduce the number of children suffering from starvation? Are moderately
affluent people morally obligated to send money to famine relief organi-
zations to help reduce world hunger and absolute poverty? If so, what is
the extent of their obligation, i.e., just how much money must they send
to these humanitarian organizations if they are to avoid being immoral?
These questions took center stage in the 1970’s, when a spate of phi-
losophers offered arguments defending the view that affluent and moder-
ately affluent people are morally required to provide financial support to
organizations working to alleviate hunger, malnutrition, and absolute
poverty around the world. Arguments from practically every theoretical
perspective in normative ethics (except for libertarianism, which will be
discussed later) were advanced: utilitarian arguments, Kantian arguments,
human rights-based arguments, and ideal contractarian arguments. Work-
ing backwards, Jan Narveson [1977] rejects the libertarian “Nobody needs
to help anybody” stance as unreasonable,9 and using a Rawlsean approach,
he tentatively defends the view that one is free to acquire more property
than one’s neighbor, but only if one is “willing to contribute a certain
amount of one’s wealth to those in undeserved misfortune, once one gets
beyond a certain minimal amount—a fraction which perhaps increases as
one gets more and more.”10 William Aiken [1977] argues that the moral
right to be saved from starvation derives from the more general moral
right to be saved from preventable death due to deprivation and that this
latter right generates a stringent corresponding moral obligation on the
part of those in a position to prevent such deaths. As Aiken puts it: “Until
it is true that I cannot help another without putting myself in an equiva-
lent position of need (that is, dying of deprivation), I have a prima facie
obligation to honor others’ right to be saved from preventable death due
to deprivation.”11 The Kantian argument is predicated on Kant’s claim
that we have an imperfect duty to help those in dire need. As I interpret
Kant, the duty is imperfect, because (i) there is no specific person to whom
we owe it, (ii) since we owe it to persons generally and since we cannot
possibly help every person in dire need, we are free to fulfill the duty in
various ways as various opportunities to help present themselves, and
(iii) the duty is a general duty that is never completely satisfied, i.e., no
matter how many people in dire need we help, we are still obligated to
help other people in dire need when we can do so. It is not a duty that we
should only fulfill when some especially salient case presents itself. It is a
duty that we should fulfill whenever we can, provided doing so won’t pre-
vent us from our doing any of our other overriding duties. Most of us
living in affluent nations have relatively few nearby opportunities to help
people in dire need (because most of the people we regularly encounter
are not in dire need). But there are millions of people elsewhere who are
in dire need (of food, medicine, etc.) and some of whom we can help by
sending money to organizations like OXFAM, and so, on Kantian grounds,
we ought to send money to these organizations whenever doing so will
not prevent us from carrying out any of our other duties.12 Emphasizing
consequentialist reasoning, Peter Unger [1996] argues that our primary
basic moral values entail the following Pretty Demanding Dictate:
(P1) On pain of living a life that’s seriously immoral, a typical well-off
person, like you and me, must give away most of her financially
valuable assets, and much of her income, directing the funds to lessen
efficiently the serious suffering of others.13
In his seminal article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer
[1972] offers a utilitarian argument to the effect that we ought to send
famine relief organizations “as much money as possible, that is, at least
up to the point at which by giving more one would be begin to cause
serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents—perhaps even beyond
this point to the point of marginal utility.”14 Singer begins his argument
with the following much-discussed example:
The Pond: Suppose that on my way to give a lecture I notice that a
small child has fallen in [a pond] and is in danger of drowning. Would
anyone deny that I ought to wade in and pull the child out? This will
mean getting my clothes muddy and either canceling my lecture or
delaying it until I can find something dry to change into; but com-
pared with the avoidable death of the child this is insignificant.15
The Pond example is supposed to motivate the following principle:
9 Jan Narveson, “Morality and Starvation” in World Hunger and Moral Obliga-
tion, William Aiken and Hugh La Follette (eds.)(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1977), 63.
10 Ibid., 62-63.
11 William Aiken, “The Right to Be Saved from Starvation” in World Hunger and
Moral Obligation, (cited in n. 9, above), 86 and 93. Aiken argues (91-93) that one’s
right to be saved from starvation is claimable against all persons who satisfy three
minimal conditions: (i) they must know that the person is starving, (ii) they must have
the means necessary to save the person, and (iii) they must be able to save the person
without placing themselves in an equally bad or worse situation than the person they
are saving.
12 For a more detailed Kantian defense of our duty to assist the world’s absolutely
poor, see Onora O’Neill’s “Ending World Hunger,” in World Hunger and Moral Obli-
gation, William Aiken and Hugh La Follette (eds.), 2nd ed.(Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1996), 85-112.
13 Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, 134.
14 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs,
vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring, 1972), 234.
15 Ibid.
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(P2) If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral signifi-
cance, we ought to do it.16
Singer takes (P2) to be uncontroversial and thinks it explains why we
ought to pull the child from the pond. Given (P2), Singer reasons as fol-
lows: Since absolute poverty is very bad, we ought to prevent as much
absolute poverty as we can, without thereby sacrificing anything of com-
parable moral significance. Since most of the material possessions with
which we surround ourselves pale in significance compared to an inno-
cent child’s life, we ought to forego such luxuries and save children in-
stead.
These arguments taken together present us with a certain sort of
puzzle. First, each of these arguments is initially quite compelling, at
least if one accepts the normative framework within which the argument
is couched. For example, it seems that any hedonistic or preference act-
utilitarian is committed to Singer’s principle (P2), regardless whether The
Pond justifies (P2). Since the other premises in Singer’s argument are
uncontroversial, it looks like any hedonistic or preference act-utilitarian
must accept Singer’s robust conclusion. In short, these arguments pro-
vide strong utilitarian, Kantian, rights-based, and contractarian reasons
for thinking that we have a moral duty to assist those in absolute poverty.
Second, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, human rights-based ethics, and
contractarianism are among the most widely accepted theories in norma-
tive ethics. Most philosophers working in ethics today claim to accept
some version of one of these theories. Third, with the possible exception
of Narveson’s view, all of the arguments just considered draw highly de-
manding conclusions. These arguments (esp. Singer’s, Unger’s and Ai-
ken’s) conclude that we are morally obligated to send sizeable portions of
our wealth and income to famine relief organizations like CARE, and that
we should continue doing so up to the point where further contributions
would reduce us to the same level of need as those we are trying to help.
Fourth, few people, philosophers included, contribute anything to CARE,
OXFAM, or UNICEF, and almost no one contributes sizeable portions of
their income to these organizations, even after they have heard the argu-
ments. What has gone wrong?
Perhaps such highly demanding views are psychologically overwhelm-
ing and hence counterproductive. Shelly Kagan considers such an objec-
tion. As he puts it:
[I]f morality demands too much … then when people fall short of its re-
quirements (as doubtless they will do) they will say to themselves that they
might as well obey none of morality’s requirements at all. Given this all-or-
nothing attitude, it is important that morality’s requirements not be too
severe—for were they severe morality would fall into wide neglect.17
Call this objection Too Much. According to Too Much, what has gone
wrong is that the overly demanding moral principles advocated by Singer,
Unger, and Aiken have generated a counterproductive kind of futility
thinking: “If I can’t live up to the ideal, I shouldn’t even try to approxi-
mate it.” But Too Much is a psychological thesis. Even if true, it has no
bearing on what our actual moral duties are. It is only concerned with
what moral duties and principles we should publicly espouse. In short,
Too Much can be restated as follows: “There may be good consequentialist
reasons for understating the extent of people’s actual moral obligations,
namely, that by doing so people will fulfill more of their actual obliga-
tions than they otherwise would have.” Such an observation tells us noth-
ing about what our actual duties are nor does it do anything to reduce or
minimize those actual duties. Plus, Too Much is likely false. It is highly
doubtful that people engage in the sort of all-or-nothing thinking that
Too Much predicts, for as Kagan observes: “Many people disobey the speed
limit; few consequently feel free to run down pedestrians. I see no reason
why we couldn’t teach people to think, ‘Well, I’m not doing all I should—
but only a monster would fail to do at least…”18
If all-or-nothing futility thinking isn’t to blame, then our puzzle re-
mains. Why have such seemingly compelling arguments been so ineffec-
tive in evoking behavioral change? I think the answer is more straightfor-
ward than Too Much. Moral arguments often tell people that they ought
to do things they don’t want to do. Typically, when people are presented
with an argument telling them that they ought to do X—where X is some-
thing they would rather not do—they look for reasons to reject that argu-
ment. One of the most common reasons that I have heard philosophers
give for rejecting the arguments of Singer and company runs roughly as
follows:
Singer’s preference utilitarianism is irremediably flawed, as are
Kant’s ethics, Aiken’s theory of human rights, and Rawlsean con-
tractarianism. The literature is peppered with devastating objec-
tions to these views. Since all of the aforementioned arguments are
predicated on flawed ethical theories, all these arguments are also
flawed. Until someone can provide me with clear moral reasons
grounded in a true moral theory for sending large portions of my
income to famine relief organizations, I will continue to spend my
money on what I please.
16 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 229. By “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance” Singer
means “without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something
that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in signifi-
cance to the bad thing that we prevent” (“Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, 231).
17 Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 35. Let me stress that Kagan himself does not endorse the objection un-
der consideration (see note 18). To the contrary, Kagan defends the view that morality
proper is highly demanding, so demanding in fact that we are almost always falling
short of its requirements.
18 Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, 35.
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Such a self-serving reply is both disingenuous and sophistical. It is disin-
genuous because, as noted earlier, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, human
rights-based ethics and contractarianism are among the most widely ac-
cepted theories in normative ethics. In other contexts, philosophers typi-
cally embrace one of these four theoretical approaches to ethics. It is so-
phistical since a similar reply could be used to “justify” or rationalize
virtually any behavior. Since no moral theory to date is immune to objec-
tion, one could, for example, “justify” rape on the grounds that all of the
arguments against rape are predicated on flawed ethical theories.
The speciousness of such a “justification” of rape is obvious. No one
who seriously considered the brutality of rape could think that it is some-
how justified/permissible simply because all current ethical theories are
flawed. But such specious reasoning is often used to “justify” allowing
millions of innocent children to starve to death each year. I aim to block
this spurious reply by providing an argument for the moral obligatoriness
of (O1) and (O2) which does not rest on any particular, highly contentious
ethical theory. Rather, it rests on beliefs you already hold.19
One caveat before we begin. Ethical arguments are often context-de-
pendent in that they presuppose a specific audience in a certain set of
circumstances. Recognizing what that intended audience and context is
can prevent confusions about the scope of the ethical claim being made.
My argument is context-dependent in precisely this way. It is not aimed
at those relatively few people in developed nations who are so impover-
ished that they couldn’t contribute to famine relief without extreme sac-
rifice. Rather, it is directed at people like you who are relatively well-off
and who could easily contribute to famine relief with minimal sacrifice. I
intend to show that your beliefs commit you to the view that it is morally
wrong not to support famine relief organizations (or other organizations
working to reduce unnecessary suffering) for anyone who is in the cir-
cumstances in which you typically find yourself, and, a fortiori, that it is
morally wrong for you not to support such organizations. Enough by way
of preamble, on to your beliefs.
2. The Things You Believe
The beliefs attributed to you herein would normally be considered non-
contentious. In most contexts, we would take someone who didn’t hold
these beliefs to be either morally defective or irrational. Of course, in
most contexts, people aren’t being asked to part with their hard-earned
cash. Still, even with that two-week luxury cruise in the Bahamas on the
line, you will, I think, readily admit believing the following propositions:
(B1) Other things being equal, a world with less (more) pain and suffering
is better (worse) than a world with more (less) pain and suffering. (B2) A
world with less (more) unnecessary suffering is better (worse) than a world
with more (less) unnecessary suffering.20 For those who have doubts as to
whether or not they really do believe these two propositions, compare our
world á as it actually is—where millions of innocent children suffer slow
painful deaths from starvation each year—with possible world W1, where
W1 is like our world in every respect except for two, namely, in W1 every
child has sufficient food to eat and every country has instituted effective
population measures that have reduced human population to sustainable
levels. W1 is clearly a better world than á, and you know that it is. After
all, unnecessary suffering is intrinsically bad and a contains vastly more
unnecessary suffering than W1.
21
Unnecessary suffering isn’t the only thing you disvalue, as is evidenced
by your belief: (B3) A world with fewer (more) unnecessary childhood deaths
is better (worse) than a world with more (fewer) unnecessary childhood
deaths. Since you believe (B3) and also believe that unnecessary suffering
is intrinsically bad, you no doubt believe both: (B4) It is bad when an
innocent child under the age of 5 dies instantly in an automobile acci-
dent, and (B5) It is even worse when an innocent child under 5 suffers a
slow painful death from starvation. These beliefs together commit you to
the belief: (B6) Other things being equal, the world would be: (i) better if
there were fewer children starving to death, (ii) much better if there were
no children starving to death, and (iii) worse if there were more children
starving to death.
Having reflected upon Singer’s Pond, you surely believe: (B7) It is wrong
to let an innocent child under age 5 drown when one can easily save that
child with no risk and with minimal cost to oneself. The fact that you
accept (B7) demonstrates that you believe that there are at least some
positive duties, i.e., duties to benefit others. So, you probably believe: (B8)
We ought to take steps to make the world a better place, especially those
steps that require little effort and minimal sacrifice on our part. But even
if you reject (B8) on the grounds that we have no positive duties (or very
limited positive duties), you still think there are negative duties to do no
harm, and so you believe: (B8') One ought to avoid making the world a
worse place, at least whenever one can do so with minimal effort and neg-
ligible sacrifice. You also believe: (B9) A morally good person will take
steps to make the world a better place and even stronger steps to avoid
making the world a worse place; and (B10) Even a “minimally decent per-
19 Obviously, if you do not hold these beliefs (or enough of them), my argument will
have no force for you, nor is it intended to. It is only aimed at those of you who do hold
these widespread commonsense beliefs.
20 By “unnecessary suffering” I mean suffering which serves no greater, outweigh-
ing justifying good. If some instance of suffering is required to bring about a greater
good (e.g., a painful root canal may be the only way to save a person’s tooth), then that
suffering is not unnecessary. Thus, in the case of (B2), no ceteris paribus clause is needed,
since if other things are not equal such that the suffering in question is justified by an
overriding justifying good which can only be achieved by allowing that suffering, then
that suffering is not unnecessary.
21 Anyone who has felt the force of the atheistic argument from evil based on gratu-
itous suffering (and that includes most philosophers) is committed to (B1) and (B2). The
reason we think a wholly good God would prevent unnecessary suffering is because we
think that such suffering is intrinsically bad and that the world would be better with-
out it.
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son”22 would take steps to help reduce the amount of unnecessary pain,
suffering, and death in the world, if s/he could do so with little effort on
her/his part.
You also have beliefs about the sort of person you are. You believe one
of the following propositions when the reflexive pronoun is indexed to
yourself: (B11) I am a morally good person; or (B12) I am at least a mini-
mally decent person. You also believe of yourself: (B13) I am the sort of
person who certainly would take steps to help reduce the amount of un-
necessary pain, suffering, and death in the world, if I could do so with
little effort on my part; and (B14) I am an intellectually honest individual.
Finally, like most people, you believe: (B15) It is wrong to kill an inno-
cence person unjustly. And so, you believe: (B16) It is wrong to kill inno-
cent children between the ages of 2 and 5 as a means of population con-
trol, when equally effective non-lethal means of population control are
readily available. Even where unjust killing is not involved, you believe:
(B17) Other things being equal, it is better when a person lives out her
natural lifespan than when she dies prematurely. Since you believe (B7),
(B8), (B10), and (B17), presumably you also believe: (B18) Other things be-
ing equal, it is wrong to let an innocent person die, when one can prevent
that death with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice. Since (B18) is com-
pletely general in its application, it commits you to the following belief as
well: (B19) Other things being equal, it is wrong to let an innocent person
die as a means of population control, when one can prevent that death
with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice and when equally effective
non-lethal means of population control are readily available.
3. Why YOU Are Committed
 to the Moral Obligatoriness of (O1)
The burden of the present section is to show that your beliefs (B1)–(B19)
already commit you to obligation (O1). Using different subsets of {(B1),
(B2), … , (B19)}, I will argue that anyone who believes (B1)–(B19) is com-
mitted to accepting two commonsensical, minimally-demanding, norma-
tive principles, and that these two principles entail that we are morally
obligated (O1) to send a modest portion of our income to famine relief
organizations and/or other organizations working to reduce unnecessary
suffering. Because each of these normative principles independently en-
tails obligation (O1), you don’t have to believe all of (B1)–(B19) for my argu-
ment to succeed. However, the more of these propositions you believe,
the greater your commitment to the obligatoriness of (O1).
Upon closer inspection, the arguments for demanding dictates like
those advocated by Unger and Singer break down. For example, Unger’s
argument for his Pretty Demanding Dictate is predicated on The Weak
Principle of Ethical Integrity:
Other things being even nearly equal, if it’s all right for you to impose
losses on others with the result that there’s a significant lessening in the
serious losses suffered by others overall, then, if you’re to avoid doing what’s
seriously wrong, you can’t fail to impose much lesser losses on yourself,
nor can you fail to accept such lesser losses, when the result’s a much more
significant lessening of such serious losses overall.23 (Unger’s italics; bold
emphasis mine)
But this principle is false. The fact that it would be permissible for you to
impose certain losses on others does not entail that it is obligatory for you
to impose lesser losses on yourself. It only entails that it would be permis-
sible for you to impose such losses on yourself, and that has never been in
doubt. What is at issue is whether or not we are obligated to impose such
losses on ourselves. Since Unger’s argument is predicated on a false nor-
mative principle, his argument for Pretty Demanding Dictate is unsound.
In order for Singer’s argument for the obligation to assist to be sound,
his principle (P2) must be true, but is (P2) true? Singer suggests that it is
the truth of (P2) that accounts for the wrongness of letting the child drown.
To be sure, (P2) entails that it is wrong to let the child drown. But so do
many other weaker principles. Consider the following highly specific prin-
ciple:
(P3) If one encounters a young child drowning in a shallow pond and one
can save the child without personal risk and without ruining more
than $400 worth of clothes, then one ought to save the child.
Like (P2), (P3) also entails that it is wrong to let the child drown. So, it is
not clear that it is (P2)’s truth that accounts for the wrongfulness of let-
ting the child drown. Perhaps, it is the truth of (P3) instead. To be sure,
one can rightfully object that (P3) is not couched at the appropriate level
of generality for a normative principle. The point of mentioning (P3) is
just to show that there are considerably weaker principles than (P2) that
can account for the wrongness of letting the child drown. Since other
weaker principles can account for the wrongfulness of letting the child
drown, Singer’s example does not show that (P2) is true. Here is a more
plausible principle:
(P4) Other things being equal, if you can prevent an innocent person
from dying with minimal effort, with no noticeable reduction in your
standard of living or the standard of living of your dependents, with
no risk to yourself or others, and without thereby failing to fulfill
any other more pressing obligation, then you ought to do so.24, 25
22 By a “minimally decent person” I mean a person who does the very minimum
required by morality and no more. I borrow this terminology from Judith Jarvis Thomson
who distinguishes a good Samaritan from a minimally decent Samaritan. See her “A
Defense of Abortion”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 1971, 62-65.
23 Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, 140.
24 The ceteris paribus clause is needed to insure that the principle is read as “boringly”
(in Unger’s sense) as possible. If, for example, the person whose death you could pre-
vent is a would-be ax-murderer who will kill you and your spouse if you save him, then
other things are not equal! Similarly, if the person in question has terminal cancer, is
in excruciating pain, and wants to die, then again other things are not equal. Other
things are also not equal if the only way you can prevent the person from dying is by
violating some other more stringent moral obligation.
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Unlike (P3), (P4) is sufficiently general to provide normative guidance in a
wide variety of circumstances. Moreover, (P4) also entails that it would be
wrong of you to let the child drown. Granted, if you wade into the pond,
you will ruin your cotton twill pants, your Oxford shirt, and your tweed
jacket, but being a professor you have several tweed jackets, several pairs
of Dockers, and numerous Oxford shirts.26 Even if the clothes you are
wearing are completely ruined, there will be no noticeable difference in
your standard of living. You will simply wear different clothes that are
already hanging in your closet. My modest principle (P4) has another thing
going for it, as well.  Anyone, like you, who believes (B3), (B8´), (B10), (B12),
(B17), and (B18) is already committed to (P4), on pain of inconsistency.
27
Your beliefs [(B1), (B2), (B8), and (B10)] also commit you to another
minimalistic principle:
(P5) If you can help to reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering in the
world with minimal effort on your part, with no risk to yourself or
others, with no noticeable reduction in your standard of living or
the standard of living of your dependents, and without thereby fail-
ing to fulfill any other more pressing obligation, then you ought to
do so.
Now here’s the rub. Any affluent or moderately affluent person, who is
committed to (P4) and (P5), is already committed to the obligatoriness of
sending a portion of her income to famine relief organizations and/or other
organizations working to reduce unnecessary suffering. Consider the im-
plications of your commitment to (P4). According to (P4), you ought to
prevent a person from dying if you can do so with minimal effort and no
noticeable reduction in your standard of living or that of your depen-
dents, all else equal. By sending a modest portion of your income to
OXFAM, CARE, or UNICEF, you can prevent many innocent children
from dying unnecessarily. Plus, you can do so with no noticeable reduc-
tion in your or your dependents’ standards of living, and your doing so
will not prevent you from fulfilling any more pressing obligation. So, ac-
cording to (P4), you ought to do so. It is worth noting that your belief
(B18)—It is wrong to let an innocent person die, when one can prevent that
death with minimal effort and minimal sacrifice on one’s part—entails
the same result. By not sending money to famine relief organizations like
those listed above, you are letting numerous innocent children under 5
die, when you could have easily prevented their deaths with little effort
(writing out a check) and minimal sacrifice on your part (no noticeable
reduction in your standard of living). (B18) entails that it is wrong of you
to let these children die. Thus, your beliefs about the intrinsic badness of
25 Principle (P4) is similar in spirit to Unger’s Very Cheaply Lessening Early Death
principle, but Unger’s argument for Very Cheaply Lessening Early Death presupposes
the soundness of his earlier argument for his Pretty Demanding Dictate. Since he thinks
he has established that our primary basic moral values entail his Pretty Demanding
Dictate, he concludes that it is even more obvious that our primary basic moral values
entail his much more lenient Very Cheaply Lessening Early Death. However, since his
argument for Pretty Demanding Dictate is unsound, Unger needs to offer an indepen-
dent argument for Very Cheaply Lessening Early Death.
26 I used male clothing in this example, not in a fit of wanton sexist abandon, but
simply because I am more familiar with male professorial attire. Female readers also
know that their standards of living would not be reduced in any noticeable way with
the loss of one outfit, given the amount of clothes and shoes overflowing their closets.
27 One can derive a child-restricted version of (P4) from (B3) and (B8´) as follows:
1. A world with more unnecessary childhood deaths is worse than a world with
fewer unnecessary childhood deaths. [from (B3)]
2. One ought to avoid making the world a worse place at least whenever one can do
so with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice. [(B8´)]
3. Letting an innocent child die unnecessarily makes the world a worse place than
it would have been if one had prevented that death. (from premise 1)
∴ 4. If one can avoid letting an innocent child die with minimal effort and negli-
gible sacrifice on one’s part, then one ought to do so. (from 1, 2, and 3)
5. If one can prevent an innocent child from dying with minimal effort, with no
noticeable reduction in one’s standard of living or that of one’s dependents, and
without thereby failing to fulfill any more pressing obligation, then one can avoid
letting an innocent child die with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice on one’s
part.
∴ 6. If one can prevent an innocent child from dying with minimal effort, with no
noticeable reduction in one’s standard of living or that of one’s dependents, and
without thereby failing to fulfill any more pressing obligation, then one ought to do
so. (from 4 and 5) [Conclusion 6 is a child-restricted version of (P4).]
One can derive a non-restricted version of (P4) that applies to innocent persons
generally from (B18) as follows:
1. Other things being equal, it is wrong to let an innocent person die, when one
can prevent that death with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice. [(B18)]
Premise 1 is equivalent to:
1´. Other things being equal, if one can prevent an innocent person from dying
with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice on one’s part, it is wrong to let that
person die. [(B18)]
2. If one can prevent an innocent person from dying with minimal effort, with no
noticeable reduction in one’s standard of living or that of one’s dependents, with no
risk to oneself or others, and without thereby failing to fulfill any more pressing
obligation, then one can prevent that person from dying with minimal effort and
negligible sacrifice on one’s part.
∴ 3. Other things being equal, if one can prevent an innocent person from dying
with minimal effort, with no noticeable reduction in one’s standard of living or that
of one’s dependents, with no risk to oneself or others, and without thereby failing
to fulfill any more pressing obligation, then it is wrong to let that person die. (from
1´ and 2)
4. For any person P, if it is wrong to let P die, then one ought not let P die.
5. For any person P, if one ought not let P die, then one ought to prevent P’s
death.
∴ 6. Other things being equal, if one can prevent an innocent person from dying
with minimal effort, with no noticeable reduction in one’s standard of living or that
of one’s dependents, with no risk to oneself or others, and without thereby failing
to fulfill any more pressing obligation, then one ought to prevent that person’s
death. (from 3, 4, and 5)
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unnecessary childhood deaths and our duties to help prevent such deaths
commit you to the obligatoriness of sending a portion of your income to
organizations like OXFAM, CARE, and UNICEF to prevent some of those
innocent children from dying.
Your beliefs about the intrinsic badness of unnecessary suffering [(B1)
and (B2),] and your beliefs about our duties to minimize such suffering
[(B8), (B10), (B12), and (B13)] together commit you to the view that you
ought to help reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering in the world
when you can do so with minimal effort, with no risk to yourself or oth-
ers, and with no noticeable reduction in your standard of living [i.e., they
commit you to (P5)]. Children living in absolute poverty don’t only die
from starvation. They suffer terribly from unrelenting hunger and its
attendant diseases, including impaired brain development, measles, chro-
nic diarrhea, chronic fatigue, and wasting. Sending a modest portion of
your income to OXFAM, CARE, or UNICEF will enable these organiza-
tions to provide food, clean water, and needed medications to numerous
malnourished children, thereby alleviating their suffering and greatly
reducing their risk of disease. Since you can easily do so (by making out a
check) with no risk to yourself or others, with no noticeable reduction in
your standard of living, and without failing to perform any other more
serious obligation, your beliefs, together with their concomitant, (P5), entail
that you ought to do so.
Your other beliefs support the same conclusion. You believe: (B9) A
morally good person will take steps to make the world a better place and
even stronger steps to avoid making the world a worse place; and (B10)
Even a “minimally decent person” would take steps to help reduce the
amount of unnecessary pain, suffering, and death in the world, if s/he
could do so with little effort on her/his part. You also believe that you are
a morally good person [(B11)] or at least a minimally decent one [(B12)],
and that you are the kind of person who would take steps to help reduce
the amount of pain, suffering, and death in the world, if you could do so
with little effort on your part [(B13)]. As we have already seen, with mini-
mal effort and negligible sacrifice, you could take steps to help reduce
both the number of unnecessary childhood deaths and amount of unnec-
essary suffering experienced by these impoverished children just by writ-
ing out a modest check to OXFAM, CARE, UNICEF, or some other hu-
manitarian organization working effectively to reduce the amount of un-
necessary suffering in the world. Given (B10), you ought to provide mod-
est support to one (or more) of these organizations. Given (B12) and (B13),
if you really are the kind of person you think you are, you will provide
such support to one (or more) of these organizations.
We have just seen that consistency with your other beliefs requires
that you send a portion of your income to famine relief organizations and/
or other organizations working to reduce unnecessary suffering and pre-
vent unnecessary death. But how much of your money are you obligated
to send to such worthy organizations? Here I must appeal to your belief
(B14). Since you take yourself to be an intellectually honest individual,
you must honestly ask yourself how much can you afford to send to fam-
ine relief organizations with no noticeable reduction in your standard of
living (or in the standard of living of your dependents). Granted, just how
much money you can send without noticeably reducing your standard of
living will depend on what stage of life you are in and on the extent of
your financial resources. Even so, I submit that, like most moderately
affluent people, you could easily divert 2% of your income to such worthy
causes as famine relief and global population control, without the slight-
est noticeable change in your current standard of living. I arrived at this
number in the following highly scientific manner. I asked my teaching
assistant who makes $9,000 per year if he could send 1% of his income
[$90 per year, $7.50 per month] to famine relief organizations with no
noticeable difference in his current standard of living, and he said, “Yes”.
Almost everyone reading this article, except for students who are being
forced to read it for a class, makes considerably more money than my
teaching assistant; and while it may be true that you have more financial
obligations than my T.A. (your house payment, insurance, college tuition
for your children, etc. versus his rent, insurance, student fees, etc.), still,
given the law of marginal utility, if he can afford to send in 1% of his
income with no noticeable reduction in his standard of living, you can
almost certainly afford to send in 2% of your income without noticeably
reducing your standard of living. As overpaid philosophy professors, many
of you make $40,000 a year. Two percent of $40,000 is $800/year or $15/
week. Sending $15/week to famine relief organizations would annually
prevent over 250 innocent children under age 5 from dying soon, and
your life wouldn’t be worse off in any noticeable way. Did your standard
of living change in any noticeable way when George “Read My Lips” Bush
increased your taxes by 2% (while promising to cut them)? No. So, it is
extremely doubtful that you would be able to notice a 2% reduction in
your current income level, especially if you have your credit card auto-
matically billed for $60 each month. It would just be another monthly
payment that you wouldn’t even notice.
Many of you could send in an even greater percentage of your income
[perhaps as much as 5% of your income] with no noticeable reduction in
your standard of living. As I said above, this is where intellectual honesty
comes in. You must honestly determine what percentage of your income
you could send to famine relief organizations without noticeably reduc-
ing your standard of living and without thereby failing to fulfill any other
overriding obligations, for, according to your own beliefs, that percentage
is the minimum amount that you are morally required to send to famine
relief organizations and/or other organizations working to reduce unnec-
essary suffering. One thing seems reasonably clear: You could easily send
1% of your income to such worthy organizations as OXFAM, CARE,
UNICEF, and IPPF28 with no noticeable difference in your standard of
28 International Planned Parenthood Federation.
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living or the standard of living of any of your dependents.29 Since your
beliefs commit you to (P4) and (P5), your beliefs commit you to contribut-
ing at the very least 1% of your income, and probably 2% or more, to such
important organizations. To do any less is seriously immoral, by your own
standards.
What about students? Since students also accept (B1)–(B19), their be-
liefs likewise entail that if they can reduce the number of innocent chil-
dren starving to death with minimal effort and negligible sacrifice on
their part, then they ought to do so. The question is whether they can do
so with minimal effort and sacrifice. If you’re a student, money’s tight,
right? As a student struggling to pay your own bills, can you really be
morally obligated to support organizations working to save the lives of
innocent impoverished children? The answer will no doubt vary from stu-
dent to student, but here again, intellectual honesty must play a role.
Would your life really be any worse off, say, if you had one less beer ($2.00)
or café latté ($2.50) per week, or one less pack of cigarettes ($4.00) per
month? Or suppose you bought one less CD ($15.00) every two months.
Would that really make your life noticeably worse off? (How many CDs
sit unused on your shelf anyway?) If honest with ourselves, most of us,
including most students, have to admit that we make lots of frivolous
purchases. Reducing the number of these frivolous purchases ever so
slightly won’t make any noticeable difference in our quality of life, and in
some cases, reducing the number of these purchases would actually im-
prove both our health and the quality of our lives, e.g. reducing the num-
ber of cigarettes one smokes or the number of high-fat café lattés one
drinks. By way of illustration, suppose you drank one fewer café lattés
per week. As a result, you would save $10 per month. By simply sending
the $10 saved each month to OXFAM, you would over the course of a year
prevent 40 children from dying soon, while your standard of living would
remain essentially the same. If you are absolutely crazy about café lattés
and feel your life wouldn’t be complete without a latté a day, then you
must honestly ask yourself whether you could cut back on some other
frivolous purchases without noticeably reducing the quality of your life.
Even just buying one less CD per year and sending that $15.00 to UNICEF
would prevent 5 children from dying soon. The point is simply this: By
cutting out a frivolous purchase here or there, even students could help
reduce the number of innocent children suffering and dying from abso-
lute poverty and malnutrition, with minimal effort and no noticeable re-
duction in their standards of living.
The moral of the present section is clear. Consistency with your own
beliefs forces you to admit: (i) that you are morally obligated to send a
portion of your income to famine relief organizations and/or other organi-
zations working to reduce the amount of unnecessary pain, suffering and
death in the world, and (ii) that the minimum you are obligated to send is
whatever amount you could send with no noticeable reduction in your or
your dependents’ standards of living and without thereby failing to meet
any of your other more stringent obligations. For most of us, that means
sending 2% of our income to such organizations (which amounts to around
1.5% of your income after taxes). For most students, it means cutting
back on a few frivolous purchases and sending the money saved to one of
these organizations. To make fulfilling this obligation as easy and effort-
less as possible, I have provided the addresses and phone numbers for
OXFAM, CARE, UNICEF, and IPPF at the end of this article.
4. Why YOU Are Committed
 to the Moral Obligatoriness of (O2) 
30
We have just seen that your beliefs entail that we are obligated: (O1) To
send a modest portion of our income to humanitarian organizations work-
ing to reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering in the world. But our
duties to the world’s absolutely poor don’t stop with (O1). As we shall
presently see, your beliefs also entail that we are obligated: (O2) To re-
frain from squandering food that could be fed to the world’s absolutely
poor, especially when doing so involves no risk to ourselves or others.
a. Malnutrition
When we think of malnutrition, images of poor starving children wasting
away in undeveloped nations quickly come to mind. We don’t think of the
obese people suffering from diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease that
are all too common in developed countries. But these latter people are
clearly malnourished, as well.  The fact is there are two kinds of malnu-
trition, undernutrition and overnutrition, and both of them result in pre-
ventable disease, unnecessary suffering, and premature death. Undernu-
trition arises when a person consumes insufficient calories and/or insuffi-
cient macro- and micro-nutrients to meet the basic energy and nutrient
requirements for normal biological and metabolic function. Undernutri-
tion causes a wide variety of deficiency diseases including: tissue wasting
[due to protein deficiency]; brain underdevelopment [due to inadequate
fat consumption prior to age 2]; blindness [vitamin A deficiency], scurvy
[vitamin C deficiency], beriberi [thiamin deficiency], and pellagra [niacin
and protein deficiency], and death from starvation [insufficient calories].
These diseases, so common in undeveloped countries, are virtually non-
existent in developed nations. Overnutrition arises when one consumes
too many calories, excess fat, excess saturated fat, excess protein, excess29 In conversation, Hon-Lam Li suggested to me that one can defend the 1% mini-
mum requirement by employing a method of approximation similar to that used by
scientists and mathematicians. Given the method of approximation, a 1% reduction in
one’s income is seen to be so small as to approximate zero. Since a 1% reduction would
approximate no reduction at all, it should have no noticeable impact on one’s standard
of living.
30 The present section was heavily influenced by James Rachels’ excellent article
“Vegetarianism and ‘The Other Weight Problem’” in World Hunger and Moral Obli-
gation, (cited in n. 9, above), 180-93. I refer you to the article in its entirety. I intend to
show that your beliefs (B1)–(B19) commit you to many of Rachels’ conclusions.
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cholesterol, excess refined sugar, and excess sodium. Overnutrition gives
rise to a wide variety of diseases of excess: coronary artery disease, stroke
and other arteriosclerotic diseases [excess cholesterol, saturated fat, trans-
fatty acids, and iron]; obesity [excess fat and calories]; hypertension [ex-
cess fat, calories and sodium], diabetes mellitus [excess fat, calories, and
refined sugar], some forms of cancer [excess fat], and osteoporosis [excess
protein consumption, coupled with inactivity]. These diseases, rampant
in developed countries, are practically unheard of in underdeveloped coun-
tries.31 As we shall see below, both forms of malnutrition have the same
root cause, a form of agriculture that (i) fosters overnutrition and (ii)
systematically requires the overnourished to squander food that could
have been made available to the undernourished.
b. Day-Old Bread: Why Squandering Food
in a World of Scarcity Is Morally Wrong
Day-Old Bread: Suppose there is a small bakery in my neighborhood that
sells its day-old bread at 1/3 the regular price. The bakery doesn’t want to
run out of bread for its full-paying customers, so it typically bakes twelve
more loaves of bread than it anticipates needing. Also suppose there is a
small homeless shelter for battered women and children in the neighbor-
hood that can only afford to buy the discounted day-old bread. When there
is no day-old bread available, these people go without food for the day.
Suppose I know all these facts, but I, nevertheless, start buying the re-
maining twelve loaves of bread (in addition to the loaf I regularly buy)
right before the bakery closes each day, just because I like the way it
makes my kitchen smell. As a result, there is no longer any day-old bread
available. Of course, I can’t eat that much bread. So, the next day, when
that fresh-baked smell is gone, I simply throw all twelve loaves of bread
in the garbage. By squandering food in this way, I have knowingly caused
the women and children in the shelter to go hungry, and I have done so,
just to satisfy my trivial desire to have my kitchen smell a certain way.
Finally, suppose I keep up my bread-purchasing habit for so long that
some of these women and children end up dying from hunger-related
diseases.32
Have I done anything wrong? Your beliefs entail that I have. You be-
lieve that a world with more unnecessary suffering is worse than a world
with less unnecessary suffering [(B2)], and you also believe that we ought
to avoid making the world a worse place when we can do so with minimal
effort and negligible sacrifice [(B8')]. In Day-Old Bread, I have knowingly
squandered food that these women and children would have been able to
eat and have, thus, knowingly caused them to suffer unnecessarily, just
so that I could experience a certain olfactory sensation. I have knowingly
made the world a worse place by increasing the amount of unnecessary
suffering it contains, for an entirely trivial reason. Here, I have actively
and knowingly made others worse off. One thing I could have easily done
to avoid making the world a worse place would have been to purchase
only the bread I need, leaving the rest for others to consume. Perhaps, it
would not be wrong of me to purchase vastly more bread than I need in a
world where everyone’s food needs are adequately met, but as your be-
liefs rightly reveal, it is wrong of me to waste food that could be fed to
severely undernourished humans who desperately need that food. Sim-
ply put, your beliefs entail that we are obligated: (O2) To refrain from
squandering food that could be fed to others who desperately need it.
Multi-Squanderer Scenario: Suppose I am not unique in my desire to
smell fresh-baked bread. Suppose that there are people in every commu-
nity in America who enjoy the smell of fresh-baked bread as much as I do
and who, like me, buy up all the available bread at their local bakeries
just before closing time so that there is no day-old bread available any-
where in the country. And suppose that, as a result, women and children
in shelters all across America are starving to death, just so lots of other
Americans can enjoy the smell of fresh-baked bread. Does the fact that
lots of other people are squandering bread in this way make it any less
wrong of me to squander the bread from my local bakery? Not one bit.
The fact that other people are behaving immorally does not justify my
doing so. Given your beliefs, the only difference between Day-Old Bread
and Multi-Squanderer Scenario is that in the latter case lots of other
people are just as morally culpable as I.
c. Eating in a World of Scarcity: (O2)’s Implications
Day-Old Bread illustrates that your beliefs commit you to the moral
obligatoriness of not squandering food that could be fed to the world’s
absolutely poor. You are not alone in this commitment. Anyone who be-
lieves (B1)–(B19), and that includes almost everyone, is committed to the
obligatoriness of (O2). Even without appealing to (B1)–(B19), almost every-
one would agree that it is wrong to knowingly throw bread away that
could save other people’s lives and that, therefore, we are obligated not to
squander food in this way. What most people don’t realize is that in order
to fulfill obligation (O2), they must radically change the way they eat.
If you are like most moderately affluent people, you eat meat and lots
of it: bacon or sausage for breakfast, one or two quarter pound hamburg-
ers for lunch, and steak, pork chops, or chicken for dinner. For most people
in affluent nations, eating this way is normal—it’s how they were raised
to eat—and it seems not only permissible, but downright wholesome. But
things are not always as they seem. The burden of the present section is
to show that anyone who believes (B1)–(B19) is already committed, on pain
of inconsistency, to the immorality of eating most meat. Elsewhere, I have
argued that beliefs like (B1), (B2), (B8), (B8'), and (B10) commit one to the
31 The distribution of these diseases is so closely associated with the degree of eco-
nomic development that Cornell professor of nutritional biochemistry, Colin Campbell,
has termed the former diseases “diseases of poverty” and the latter “diseases of afflu-
ence.” See T. Colin Campbell and Christine Cox, The China Project: The Keys to Better
Health, Discovered in Our Living Laboratory (Ithaca, NY: New Century Nutrition,
1996), 9.
32 Rachels discusses a similar example in his “Vegetarianism and ‘The Other Weight
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immorality of eating meat and other animal products, because of the enor-
mous amount of unnecessary animal suffering modern animal factories
generate.33 Here, I am interested in the untold human suffering that such
a system of agriculture produces.
The numbers used in Day-Old Bread were not chosen at random. They
were chosen because it takes 12.9 pounds of grain to produce one pound
of beef.34 This grain could be fed directly to the world’s starving poor, but
instead is fed to intentionally-bred cows—cows that would not have ex-
isted and, hence, would not have needed to be fed, had we not artificially
inseminated their mothers—and these cows, in turn, convert that grain
to manure. By cycling grain through cattle to produce animal protein, we
lose 90% of that grain’s protein, 96% of its calories, 100% of its carbohy-
drates, and 100% of its fiber.35 By cycling grain through cattle so that
affluent people can eat meat, starving humans are being deprived of that
grain so that cows can be fed. As a result, while over 1 billion humans
experience chronic hunger, cows in feedlots never go hungry. Playing off
our Day-Old Bread analogy, those 12.9 pounds of grain could have been
converted to 12.9 loaves of bread that could have, in turn, been fed to the
world’s starving poor. Instead, that grain/bread is wasted, just so people
in affluent nations can eat meat and other animal products. There is no
way around it: Whenever one purchases a pound of beef, one is support-
ing a system of agriculture that effectively squanders 12.9 pounds of grain
for every pound of beef produced.
While beef production is one of the most inefficient means of food
production, all forms of animal agriculture are highly inefficient. Of the
12 million tons of grain protein produced in the U.S. in 1991, 10 millions
tons were fed to livestock, leaving only 2 million tons for human con-
sumption. Of the 9.2 million tons of legume protein produced in the U.S.
that year, 9 million tons were fed to livestock, leaving only 0.2 million
tons for human consumption. For the 21 million tons of plant protein fed
to livestock, we only received 7 million tons of livestock protein in return
(a 33% protein-conversion efficiency rate).36 The end result being a net
loss of 14 million tons of protein, protein that could have saved the lives
of starving children had it not been squandered on livestock production.
And protein isn’t the only macronutrient we lose by feeding grain to live-
stock. We also lose all of that grain’s carbohydrates and fiber (meat con-
tains no carbohydrates or fiber), and approximately 90 percent of its ca-
loric energy.37 I noted at the outset that the U.S. grows more than enough
grain and soybeans to feed the world’s entire human population. Unfor-
tunately, most of that grain is squandered on livestock production. Of the
estimated 740 kg of grain grown in the U.S. per person per year, 663 kg
are fed to livestock, leaving only 77 kg for human consumption.38 Were
we to forego foods of animal origin and eat that grain directly, there would
be more than enough grain left over to feed the world’s starving human
population.
The irony is that the same system of agriculture that deprives grain to
starving humans, thereby contributing to undernutrition in poor nations,
is also one of the primary causes of overnutrition in affluent nations. It is
now an established fact that diets high in saturated fat and cholesterol
greatly increase the risk of several chronic degenerative diseases, includ-
ing heart disease, hypertension, obesity, diabetes, and some forms of can-
cer.39 We also know that meat and animal products are the principal sources
33 See my “The Immorality of Eating Meat” in The Moral Life, Louis Pojman (ed.)
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 856-889. There, I documented
that the routine unanaesthetized mutilations (castration, branding, dehorning, debe-
aking, dubbing, tail docking, and tooth pulling) and abysmal living conditions which
farm animals are forced to endure in factory farms, along with inhumane transporta-
tion and slaughter processes, greatly increase the amount of unnecessary suffering in
the world; and I argued that because you could easily take steps to help reduce such
unnecessary suffering by eating something other than meat, consistency with your
beliefs forces you to admit that eating meat is morally wrong.
34 NASS, USDA, Agricultural Statistics 1997, Table 1-72, I-47. Thanks to the rou-
tine use of antibiotics and growth hormones, this 12.9:1 grain-to-beef conversion ratio
is down from the 16:1 ratio often cited. To be sure, the grain-to-meat conversion ratios
are lower for pigs and chickens, 6.9:1 and 2:1, respectively [Food, Energy, and Society,
David Pimentel and Marcia Pimentel (eds.), Revised ed.  (Niwot, CO: University Press
of Colorado, 1996), 79 and 81.], but even at these lower conversion ratios, pig and
chicken production squanders grain that could be fed to starving children.
35 John Robbins, Diet for a New America (Walpole, NH: Stillpoint, 1987), 352.
36 The data on protein production and consumption in the U.S. is taken from Table
8.1 of Food, Energy, and Society, David Pimentel and Marcia Pimentel (eds.), Revised
ed. (Niwot, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1996), 78.
37 A brief explanation of the trophic pyramid will explain why so much energy is lost
by cycling grain through livestock. Ecologists refer to green plants and certain bacteria
and protozoans as autotrophs (literally, “self-nourishers”), because they convert solar
energy and inorganic matter into energy-rich organic molecules via photosynthesis. In
contrast, animals and most microorganisms are heterotrophs (literally, “nourished from
others”), because they must obtain their energy and most of their nutrients by eating
other organisms. Autotrophs, the primary producers of food energy, comprise the first
trophic level of every food chain. As autotrophs are consumed, their energy is trans-
ferred to heterotrophic consumers up the food chain. At the second trophic level are
primary consumers—herbivores that consume plants directly. The third trophic level
consists of secondary consumers—carnivores that eat herbivores. The fourth trophic
level is comprised of tertiary consumers—carnivores that eat other carnivores. Because
herbivores and carnivores are more active than plants, they expend a significant amount
of their assimilated energy on maintenance, making that energy unavailable to the
next trophic level. Ecologists use the term ‘trophic efficiency’ to refer to the percentage
of energy that is transferred from one trophic level to the next. Trophic efficiencies
range from 5-20%, meaning that 95-80% of the energy at one level never gets trans-
ferred to the next level. Since terrestrial habitats have a mean trophic efficiency of
~10%, roughly 90% of the caloric energy fed to livestock animals does not get trans-
ferred to the humans who consume them. Were humans to consume plants directly,
there would be approximately 90% more food energy available for assimilation by hu-
mans.
38 Food, Energy, and Society, 77-78.
39 For a detailed discussion of these claims, see my “The Immorality of Eating Meat”,
873-77.
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of saturated fat and cholesterol in standard Western diets.40 The evidence
is so compelling that the American Dietetic Association, the leading nu-
tritional organization in the U.S., now maintains:
Scientific data suggest positive relationships between a vegetarian diet and
reduced risk for several chronic degenerative diseases and conditions, in-
cluding obesity, coronary artery disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus,
and some types of cancer … It is the position of The American Dietetic Asso-
ciation (ADA) that appropriately planned vegetarian diets are healthful, are
nutritionally adequate, and provide health benefits in the prevention and
treatment of certain diseases.41
The ADA also holds: “Well-planned vegan and lacto-ovo vegetarian diets
are appropriate for all stages of the life cycle, including during pregnancy
and lactation. Appropriately planned vegan and lacto-ovo vegetarian di-
ets satisfy nutrient needs of infants, children, and adolescents and pro-
mote normal growth.”42
One result of feeding our children a meat-based diet—childhood obe-
sity—is both ironic and sad. While children in underdeveloped countries
are starving to death, more than one fifth of U.S. children are obese.43
Plus, the damage to coronary arteries arising from a meat-based diet be-
gins remarkably early. Dr. Spock points out: “Fatty deposits are now typi-
cally found in the coronary arteries of children on a typical American diet
by the age of three. And by the age of twelve, they are found in 70%
percent of children.”44 As a result, Dr. Spock now recommends vegan di-
ets for all children over the age of 2. These last observations demonstrate
that our duty not to squander food is not overridden by a biological need
to consume meat and animal products. There is no such need. Neither
adults nor children need to consume any animal products at all.45 As the
ADA has averred, appropriately planned vegan diets—diets devoid of meat
and animal products—are nutritionally adequate for all stages of the life
cycle. If Dr. Spock is right, appropriately planned vegan diets are nutri-
tionally superior to meat-based diets. Either way, we have no need for
meat and animal products. We eat them only because we like the way
they taste.
Does the desire for a particular taste sensation justify us in squander-
ing food that could be fed to starving children? No. In Day-Old Bread, we
saw that your beliefs entail the wrongness of squandering 12 loaves of
bread, just so one can experience a particular olfactory sensation. By do-
ing so, one not only fails to benefit others, one actively make others worse
off. Of course, by purchasing meat because one likes its taste, one is squan-
dering 12 pounds of grain, just to experience a particular gustatory sensa-
tion, and in so doing, one is actively making others—those in desperate
need of that grain—worse off. Surely, the fact that it is a gustatory sensa-
tion, rather than an olfactory sensation, is not morally relevant. Since
your beliefs entail that it is wrong to squander bread in Day-Old Bread,
your beliefs also entail that it is wrong to squander grain by purchasing
meat. Hence, your commitment to the obligatoriness of not squandering
grain commits you to the obligatoriness of adopting a predominantly plant-
based diet devoid of meat and animal products obtained from grain-fed
animals. Since virtually all commercially-produced meat (including beef,
pork, chicken, turkey, and farm-raised fish), dairy products, and eggs come
from grain-fed animals, consistency with your own beliefs requires that
you adopt a quasi-vegan diet devoid of beef, pork, pork, chicken, turkey,
farm-raised fish, dairy products and eggs.46
One might object that (O2) does not entail the obligatoriness of adopt-
ing such a diet on the grounds that the difficulty of planning a nutrition-
ally balanced quasi-vegan diet for oneself and one’s family simply makes
such a diet too risky. Such an objection is entirely unfounded. It is ex-
tremely easy to eat a nutritionally balanced vegan diet. No special food
combining is necessary.  All one need do is eat sufficient calories centered
around the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine’s new four
food groups: I. Whole Grains (5+ servings/day), II. Vegetables (3+ serv-
ings/day), III. Fruits (3+ servings/day), and IV. Legumes (2+ servings/
day).47 Anyone who eats the recommended daily servings from these new
four food groups will be eating a nutritionally sound plant-based diet.
And far from being risky, such a diet will reduce one’s risk of heart dis-
ease, cancer, stroke, hypertension, obesity, and diabetes.
There is no justification for squandering precious grain reserves in a
world of food scarcity. This conclusion is not derived from some highly
contentious ethical theory you likely reject, but from beliefs you already
hold. Consistency with your own beliefs entails that it’s wrong to squan-
der food that could be fed to the world’s starving poor, for trivial reasons
like taste or smell. Since modern meat, dairy, and egg production neces-
sarily squanders grain that could be fed directly to humans, your own
40 Dietary cholesterol is only found in meat and animal products.
41 “Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian Diets”, Journal of the
American Dietetic Association, 97, (November 1997), 1317. For those wishing to learn
more about sound vegetarian nutrition, the ADA has published this article in its en-
tirety at: www.eatright.org/adap1197.html.
42 “Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian Diets”, 1318.
43 According to “Periodic Health Examination, 1994 Update: 1. Obesity in Child-
hood”, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 150, (1994), 871-879, the second U.S.
National Health and Nutrition Survey revealed that 27.1% of U.S. children age 6-11
and 21.9% of adolescents age 12-17 were obese.
44 Benjamin Spock and S. Parker, Dr. Spock’s Baby and Child Care, 7th ed. (New
York: Dutton, 1998), 327.
45 The only exception to this rule is that human infants, ideally, should be fed hu-
man breast milk, which is, of course, an animal product.
46 Note: (O2) does not entail that it is wrong to eat meat per se, e.g. it does not entail
that eating the flesh of wild animals is wrong. Hence, the use of ‘quasi-vegan’ in the
text. However, (O2) does entail that it is wrong to eat virtually all commercially-pro-
duced meat and animal products, because these products are obtained from grain-fed
animals and their production necessarily squanders grain which could have been fed to
starving humans.
47 Neal Barnard, Food for Life: How the New Four Food Groups Can Save Your Life
(New York: Harmony Books, 1993), 144-147.
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beliefs entail that it is wrong to consume these products, which, in turn,
entails that quasi-vegan diets are obligatory.
5. Objections and Replies
a. The Iteration Objection
In section 3, after showing that Singer’s and Unger’s attempts to defend
highly demanding dictates fail, I argued that your beliefs commit you to
two much less demanding normative principles (P4) and (P5), which, in
turn, entail that you are obligated: (O1) To send a modest portion of your
income to famine relief organizations and/or other organizations working
to reduce unnecessary suffering. The present worry is that these two prin-
ciples will ultimately reduce to the very same highly demanding dictate
from which I was aiming to distance myself. Because standards of living
are vague and lack precise boundaries, there can be a repeated series of
non-noticeable reductions in one’s standard of living, such that, before
long, one is radically worse off than one’s original starting position, and
noticeably so.
My response is quite simple. Neither (P4) nor (P5) is intended to be
iterated in this way. In fact, (P4) and (P5) are intended to be compatible
with gradual increases in one’s standard of living, so as to enable one to
do even more to help reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering down
the road. To block the iteration objection and to make explicit the kinds
of principles your beliefs clearly commit you to, (P4) and (P5)—as they
apply to moderately affluent people—should be restricted as follows: the
principles never require a moderately affluent person to have a standard
of living noticeably lower than the highest standard of living she has ever
enjoyed.48 Even with this restriction in place, (P4) and (P5) still entail that
most of us are morally required to send at least 2% of our income to
famine relief organizations and/or other organizations working to reduce
unnecessary suffering. The reason is this: Since standards of living typi-
cally continue to improve the longer people are in the workforce, most
people are currently enjoying their highest standards of living. (P4) and
(P5) require these people to provide whatever amount of financial assis-
tance they can provide without noticeably lowering their standard of liv-
ing from its current optimal level.
b. The Libertarian Objection: There Are No Positive Duties.
Strict libertarians insist that, while we have negative duties to do no harm,
we have no positive duties to assist others. Thus, on the libertarian view,
it would not be wrong of you to let the child drown in Singer’s Pond.
Libertarians maintain that even though you could save the child with
minimal sacrifice and no risk to yourself, you have absolutely no positive
obligation to assist the child in any way. Since they deny the existence of
positive duties, libertarians contend that it also would not be wrong of
you not to save the lives of numerous starving children by sending a mod-
est portion of your income to famine relief organizations. Granted, liber-
tarians do think that it would be good of you to wade in and save the
child. They also think it would be good of you to send money to such
worthy causes as famine relief, but these actions would be entirely super-
erogatory on your part. Thus, the libertarian objection runs as follows:
since there are no positive duties, we have no obligation to send money to
famine relief organizations, even though that money would save the lives
of numerous innocent children.
As noted earlier, Narveson claims that such a libertarian “nobody needs
to help anybody” stance is unreasonable. A variation on the trolley prob-
lem suggests that he is right. Suppose that six innocent people are trapped
on the tracks and a runaway trolley is barreling down on them. Fortu-
nately, you just happen to be standing right next to a switch which, if
flipped, will divert the trolley onto a second track. Even more fortunately,
unlike typical trolley problems where three people are trapped on the
second track and you have to decide between killing three and letting six
die, in the present trolley case, there is no one on the other track, and so,
if the switch is flipped, the train will be diverted to the second track where
it will roll safely to a stop with no one being injured.49 The question is
this: Are you morally required to flip the switch and save the six people?
Not according to the libertarian. Even though you are standing right next
to the switch and can flip the switch with little effort and no sacrifice on
your part, with no risk to yourself or others, and without thereby violat-
ing any other obligations, the libertarian maintains that it would not be
wrong of you to let the six die by not flipping the switch.
Such a position strikes most of us as morally outrageous. You should
flip the switch, and it would be clearly wrong of you not to do so. And you,
no doubt, agree. Since you believe that one should wade into the pond to
save the child [(B7)], you surely think it would be wrong not to flip the
switch. I realize that a die-hard libertarian might remain unconvinced,
but you are not a die-hard libertarian. You believe that there are both
positive and negative duties. Thus, the libertarian objection under con-
sideration gives you absolutely no reason to think that (O1) is not obliga-
tory.
c. Malthusian Musings
A common reason offered for not sending money to famine relief organi-
zations is that doing so will just exacerbate the problem. If lots more
children under age 5 survive, then when they reach puberty and start
having their own children, there will be even more mouths to feed, and as
a result, there will be even more human suffering due to starvation. In
short, it is better to let 12 million children starve to death each year than
to save them and have two or three times that many children starving 15
years from now.
Couched in the more scientific language of ecology, the Malthusian
objection runs as follows: Left unchecked, organisms will reproduce until
48 No such restriction is placed on these principles as they apply to the extremely
affluent. 49 This variation on the trolley problem was suggested to me by Mark Sabel.
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50 Clark Wolf argues that population policies that aim to increase educational and
economic opportunities drive up the opportunity costs of fertility, making lower fertil-
ity individually rational. He argues that the first three policies I have listed in the text
are more effective at curbing population growth than more draconian punitive mea-
sures. See his “Population”, in A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, Dale
Jamieson (ed.) (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2001), 371.
51 Regardless of one’s views on abortion, presumably it would better to abort a fetus
quickly and relatively painlessly than to let that fetus be born only to starve to death
slowly and painfully.
they the reach the carrying capacity K of their respective ecosystems.
Once they exceed K, there will be a major crash in the population size of
that organism. By feeding starving humans, the anti-assistance argument
goes, we are simply speeding up the time at which we exceed the Earth’s
K for humans (hereafter Kh). Better to let 12 million children starve to
death each year than to exceed Kh and have an even more devastating
population crash.
The first thing to note is that we don’t think Malthusian worries about
exceeding Kh give us a good reason to let our own children starve. But if
we don’t let our children starve, then as adults, they will likely procreate,
thereby hastening the time when Kh is exceeded. If ecologically-based,
global human population concerns give us a reason to let distant children
die, they give us an equally good reason to let our own children die. You
wouldn’t think of letting your own children die to help reduce human
population. So, you must not find letting children starve to death to be a
legitimate way to curb human population growth.
Second, there are other more effective ways of reducing human popu-
lation growth: improving educational opportunities and employment op-
portunities for women (which drives up the opportunity cost of procre-
ation), improving the economic security of the elderly,50 providing ready
access to birth control, and providing abortion services.51 Even more dra-
conian policies, like mandatory sterilization after having one child, are
preferable to letting children starve to death. Since there are numerous
more effective means of curbing population growth than letting innocent
children starve, anyone who accepts (B19) must think it wrong to let inno-
cent children starve as a means of population control.
Third, demographic studies repeatedly show that childhood morality
rates and birth rates are positively correlated—as childhood mortality
rates decline, so do birth rates—and so, supporting famine relief organi-
zations working to reduce the number of unnecessary childhood deaths
is, paradoxically, a way of slowing population growth. But, suppose you
question the validity of these studies. Suppose you dig in your Malthu-
sian heals and insist that feeding the world’s starving children will in-
crease the number of humans suffering from starvation down the road.
Such insistence does not absolve you from obligation (O1), it just means
that you are obligated to fulfill it in a different way. Instead of being
required to send money to a famine relief organization, you will be obli-
gated to send money to humanitarian organizations, like the IPPF, that
are working to reduce the rate of population growth in underdeveloped
countries through effective birth control measures.
Fourth, those who take Malthusian concerns seriously are even more
obligated to refrain from consuming meat and other animal products,
because intentionally breeding millions of cows and pigs and billions of
chickens greatly reduces the world’s Kh. Intentionally adding billions of
farm animals to the world greatly increases the number of animal mouths
that must be fed and, thus, greatly reduces the amount of food available
for human consumption.
d. The Imperfect Duty Objection
One might object to (O1) as follows:
I grant that my beliefs commit me to the obligatoriness of helping to
reduce unnecessary suffering, whenever I can do so with no noticeable
reduction in my standard of living, etc. Nevertheless, I am not obligated
to send money to famine relief organizations, because the duty to help
reduce unnecessary suffering is an imperfect duty that I can fulfill in
numerous ways other than sending money to famine relief organizations.52
But (O1) does not require you to send money to famine relief organiza-
tions per se. (O1) requires that you send a modest portion of your income
to famine relief organizations and/or other organizations working to re-
duce unnecessary suffering in the world. Since you believe that unneces-
sary suffering is intrinsically bad and you value a world with as little
unnecessary suffering as possible, presumably, you will want to send your
money where it will do the most good. The organizations that I have al-
ready mentioned repeatedly—OXFAM, CARE, UNICEF, and IPPF—have
proven track records of doing impressive work to reduce unnecessary
human suffering. But many other organizations are working to reduce
the amount of unnecessary suffering (both human and animal) in the
world, as well. Some of these organizations include: PCRM, HFA, FARM,
PETA, and HSUS.53 All of these latter organizations are working to re-
duce both the amount of unnecessary animal suffering caused by factory
farming and the amount of unnecessary human suffering caused by eat-
ing meat and animal products. You certainly could fulfill obligation (O1)
by sending 2% of your income to one of these latter organizations rather
than by sending it to OXFAM, CARE, UNICEF, or IPPF.  The fact that
(O1) is an imperfect duty, which you can fulfill in various ways by sending
money to any of a number of different humanitarian organizations, does
not imply that you are not obligated to send money to some such organi-
zation or other. It just entails that it is up to you to decide which of these
worthy organizations to support. Failure to support any such organiza-
tion is, by your own beliefs, seriously wrong.
52 Bruce Russell has called this objection to my attention both in discussion and in
correspondence.
53 Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, Humane Farming Association,
Farm Animal Reform Movement, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and
Humane Society of the United States, respectively.
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e. An Alternative Way to Achieve Consistency
One might object to my argument as follows: “Consistency does not de-
mand that I accept (O1) and (O2). Consistency demands that I either ac-
cept (O1) and (O2), or reject one of my present beliefs. What’s to stop me
from doing the latter?” First, since (B1)–(B19) are your beliefs, it’s not at
all clear that you could simply stop believing one of them, e.g., you could
no more stop believing that a world with more unnecessary suffering is
worse than a world with less unnecessary suffering than you could stop
believing that an external world exists. Plus, since (O1) and (O2) are sup-
ported by different subsets of (B1)–(B19), rejecting (O1) and (O2) will force
you to reject a number of your beliefs, not just a single belief. Second,
even if you could reject these beliefs, it would be irrational for you to do
so. After all, as a philosopher, you are interested in more than mere con-
sistency; you are interested in truth. You won’t reject just any belief(s)
for the sake of consistency. You’ll reject the belief(s) you think most likely
to be false. Presumably, you think your doxastic system is reasonable for
the most part, or you would have already made significant changes in it.
So, you will want to reject as few beliefs as possible. Since (B1)–(B19) are
rife with implications, rejecting several of these propositions would force
you to reject countless other beliefs on pain of incoherence, whereas ac-
cepting (O1) and (O2) would require minimal belief revision on your part.
Since (O1) and (O2) cohere with your otherwise already reasonable beliefs
and ~(O1) and ~(O2) do not, it is more reasonable to accept (O1) and (O2)
than to reject any of your other beliefs.
6. Conclusion
The implications of your beliefs are clear. Given your beliefs, it follows
that we are morally obligated: (O1) To send a modest portion of our in-
come to famine relief organizations and/or other organizations working
to reduce the amount of unnecessary pain, suffering, and death in the
world, and (O2) To refrain from squandering food that could be fed to
world’s absolutely poor. (O2), in turn, entails that we are obligated to
adopt a quasi-vegan diet, rather squander grain on a meat-based diet.
These conclusions were not derived from some highly contentious ethical
theory that you can easily reject, but from your own firmly held beliefs.
Consequently, consistency demands that you embrace these obligations
and modify your behavior accordingly.54
Appendix
Oxfam America United States Committee for UNICEF
26 West St. United Nations Children’s Fund
Boston, MA 02111 333 East 38th St.
New York, NY 10016
1-800-OXFAM US [1-800-693-2687].
UNICEF: 1-800-FOR KIDS [1-800-367-5437]
IPPF CARE
International Planned Parenthood Federation, 151 Ellis St.
Western Hemisphere Region, Inc. Atlanta, GA 30303
902 Broadway – 10th Floor
New York, NY 10010 1-800-521-CARE [1-800-521-2273]
54 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Midsouth Philosophy Confer-
ence and the Bled Conference on Ethics. I would like to thank those in attendance,
especially Nenad Mišèeviæ, Elvio Baccarini, Louis and Trudy Pojman, Alastair Norcross,
Hon-Lam Li, Nathan Nobis and Kamper Floyd, for their comments and criticisms. I
would also like to thank Bruce Russell, Clark Wolf, Mark Sabel, and Kevin Dortch for a
series of insightful email exchanges that forced me to get straight many of the ideas in
this paper. Special thanks to Matthias Steup for detailed written comments on the
penultimate draft and to Friderik and Kirsten Klampfer who, by example, helped me to
take hunger seriously.
